今天联储公布了11月初议息会议的纪要（minutes），请注意，会议纪要延时3周公布，通常会包涵一些会议当天没有公布的会上细节，但由于其延时性，找到增量信息比较困难。
经济预测的细节
由于11月的议息会议不提供FOMC委员的经济预测，因此我们仅能从纪要中的“工作人员经济展望”中捕捉到最新的FOMC委员的经济预期。
联储的议息会议上通常是由纽联储的工作人员提供一份经济展望报告（和其他不同主题的报告），随后再就这些问题展开讨论、设定自己的经济预测路径并做出政策决定的。换言之，纽联储工作人员的经济预测虽然不能代表FOMC委员对未来经济的看法，但是他们所作的预测调整会对FOMC委员的经济预测构成影响。
从11月的纪要来看，经济预测相比于9月会议时又出现了一些微妙的变化：
The projection for U.S. economic activity prepared by the staff for the November FOMC meeting was weaker than the September forecast. Broad financial conditions were expected to be considerably more restrictive over the projection period than in September, reflecting both recent market moves and upward revisions to the staff's assumptions regarding the future course of monetary policy based on recent Federal Reserve communications.
As a result, output was expected to move below the staff's estimate of potential early in 2024 and to remain below potential in 2025. Likewise, the unemployment rate was expected to be above the staff's estimate of its natural rate in 2024 and 2025.
看对产出（GDP）的预测，预计到2024年早期实际产出会运行到潜在产出以下的水平，而失业率的情况类似。而在9月的议息会议纪要中我们可知工作人员认为一直到2025年底才会看到产出低于潜在水平，失业高于潜在水平。
这仅仅过去45天的时间……预测的时间点就能出现一年半以上的调整。
再来看通胀预测：
On a 12‑month change basis, total PCE price inflation was expected to be 5.3 percent in 2022 and core inflation was expected to be 4.6 percent. The staff raised their projection for core PCE price inflation in coming quarters, reflecting their assessment that the factors that had boosted inflation since the middle of last year—most notably, strong wage growth and the effect of supply constraints on prices—would persist for longer than previously thought. With the effects of supply–demand imbalances in goods markets expected to unwind and labor and product markets expected to become less tight, the staff continued to project that inflation would decline markedly over the next two years; in 2025, both total and core PCE price inflation were expected to be 2 percent.
With inflation remaining stubbornly high, the staff continued to view the risks to the inflation projection as skewed to the upside. For real activity, sluggish growth in real private domestic spending, a deteriorating global outlook, and tightening financial conditions were all seen as salient downside risks to the projection for real activity; in addition, the possibility that a persistent reduction in inflation could require a greater-than-assumed amount of tightening in financial conditions was seen as another downside risk. The staff, therefore, continued to judge that the risks to the baseline projection for real activity were skewed to the downside and viewed the possibility that the economy would enter a recession sometime over the next year as almost as likely as the baseline.
只看最关键的部分，相比于9月预测，工作人员对核心通胀的描述变了——would persist for longer than previously thought，可能比想象的更持久。
此外，虽然9月的纪要中也出现过一次“衰退”（recession），但当时是用来形容欧洲的。本月的“recession”可是出现在了工作人员的经济展望中，甚至就直言是“明年”——“实际经济活动的基线预测的风险偏向下行，并认为经济在明年某个时候进入衰退的可能性几乎与基线相同。”
仅从纪要中经济展望的部分来指导交易，已知信息所指向的是——通胀的“幅度”交易终结，转向“韧性”；同时“衰退交易”可以开始挤入了，因为衰退风险此前一直停留在市场参与者的想象和预期之中，但11月的纪要则是首次将“衰退”一词放在经济展望的内容中，这是重大的修辞变化。
政策展望
再来看官员们的政策讨论与展望，本月纪要中有一小段引起了我的注意，且是9月时没有讨论过的议题：
Participants observed that, with inflation elevated globally, many central banks were tightening monetary policy simultaneously, contributing to an overall tightening of global financial conditions. Participants further noted that the overall tightening of global financial conditions, along with energy prices and other headwinds, was contributing to a slowdown in the growth rate of global real GDP. Participants remarked that the foreign economic slowdown, in combination with a strong U.S. dollar, was likely to weigh on the U.S. export sector, and several participants commented that there could be wider spillovers to the U.S. economy.
这一段被嵌入在对于经济增长展望的最后，看起来联储确实在考虑全球央行同时紧缩所构成的增长压力。且对自身政策目标的影响也描述得非常清晰了，即海外增长放缓和强美元不利于美国的出口。
反过来想，弱美元就是一个皆大欢喜的局面。
有关通胀，能捕捉到三条新信息：
Many participants observed that price pressures had increased in the services sector and that, historically, price pressures in this sector had been more persistent than those in the goods sector.
Some participants noted that the recent high pace of nominal wage growth, taken together with the recent low pace of productivity growth, would, if sustained, be inconsistent with achievement of the 2 percent inflation objective.
Several participants summarized reports provided by business contacts about their firms' ability to pass on higher input costs to their customers. These reports suggested that some firms continued to have solid pricing power, while in other cases cost pass-through had become more difficult.
A few participants commented that the ongoing tightness in the labor market could lead to an emergence of a wage–price spiral, even though one had not yet developed.
服务业通胀具备黏性，因此未来的通胀数据需要关注核心服务的变化。
目前的名义工资虽然在增长但是生产率却没有跟上，这和联储2%的通胀目标有冲突。换言之，更多人拿到了更多的工资，但是其生产力在下降。
联储在关注企业的定价能力，这是为了理解究竟谁在为高通胀埋单。
对于薪资通胀螺旋，看起来担忧在加剧，因为9月的纪要中只是提及了薪资-通胀螺旋的风险，而到了11月措辞变了，直接表达了持续紧的就业市场可能引致薪资-通胀螺旋。
本文转载自：智堡